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Abstract
IP prefixes undermine three goals of Internet routing:
accurate reflection of network-layer reachability, secure
routing messages, and effective traffic control. This pa-
per presents Atomic IP (AIP), a simple change to Inter-
net addressing (which in fact reverts to how addressing
once worked), that allows Internet routing to achieve these
goals.
1 The Past
Those who cannot learn from history are
doomed to repeat it. —George Santayana
In the early days of computer networking, each nascent
technology came with various idiosyncratic mechanisms
(error checking, flow control, sequencing, etc.), making
interconnection difficult. To tame this daunting diversity,
Cerf and Kahn proposed a universal internetworking layer
(IP) that would provide, among other things, a unified
and global addressing scheme [5]. IP’s original address-
ing scheme (then called “TCP addressing”) was elegant
and simple. Each address had separate network and host
components, and routers inspected only the network com-
ponent of the address until the packet found its way to
the destination network. The network addresses were im-
plicitly assumed to be at, with little correlation between
network proximity and numerical similarity. This feature
remained when the architecture moved to class-based ad-
dressing, a move precipitated by the combination of net-
work growth and differing network sizes.
This design was well suited to the early Internet with its
relatively small size and unified (or at least coo¨perative)
administration. In the 1990s, however, the Internet’s trans-
formation into a large and federated infrastructure re-
quired two major changes in its addressing architecture.
First, the rise of autonomous systems (ASes) introduced a
different granularity of control; collections of networks,
controlled by different organizations, had to be repre-
sented in routing decisions. This requirement led to the
introduction of a new set of names—the AS numbers—
that now play a crucial role in interdomain routing.
Second, the Internet’s rapid growth led to an “in-
commensurate scaling” problem because portions of the
address space (class B addresses) were being depleted
rapidly. To handle this problem, the IETF engineered a
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minor change in addressing—the introduction of class-
less addressing (CIDR) [11], which allows a more flex-
ible demarcation between the network and host address
components—along with a major change in routing,
namely the large-scale shift to prex-based interdomain
routing. The scaling properties of prefix-based routing de-
pend critically on the correlations between network and
numerical proximity, which was a radical departure from
the flat addressing used for networks originally.
These two modifications (AS numbers and prefix-
based addressing) were more a short-term engineering re-
sponse to pressing needs than a principled, long-term ar-
chitectural vision, and they brought much complication
and clutter to the Internet’s addressing scheme. The prob-
lems are not merely aesthetic; in §2, we argue that these ad
hoc modifications introduced serious problems that con-
tinue to plague Internet routing and addressing. In particu-
lar, we highlight the difficulties in routing around failures,
routing securely, and traffic engineering—problems with
interdomain routing that are directly traceable to these
new developments in addressing and routing.
In this paper, we revisit the question of Internet ad-
dressing. As we describe in §3, we propose a return
to a clean two-level addressing scheme, with the higher
level flat and globally known, and the lower level private
and local to the particular network named by the higher
level. Because network numbers no longer suffice for this
higher-level address (given that they do not represent AS-
level concerns), we introduce the notion of atomic do-
mains (ADs), which are localized subsets of today’s ASes.
We propose that addresses take the form of AD:LID pairs,
where LID is a local handle, the semantics of which only
the AD knows. We articulate the design and discuss how it
deals with the issues of avoiding failures, secure routing,
and traffic engineering.
While we are not aware of any other proposal incor-
porating all of these elements, our work borrows from,
and combines, many previously proposed ideas, and we
point out our debts as we describe our mechanism. We
also discuss some less directly related work in §4. With
the simplicity of our proposed design and its resemblance
to the Internet’s original approach, we note that our con-
tributions are less in technical innovation and more in the
rationale for why we should return to the past to confront
the future.
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2 The Present
We learn from history that we learn nothing
from history. —George Bernard Shaw
In this section, we argue that the two recent modifica-
tions to Internet addressing—AS numbers and prefix-
based routing on classless addresses—make it difficult to
route around failures, secure routing and perform traffic
engineering.
Routing around failures: A desirable property of a
routing protocol is to ensure that every route in a rout-
ing table corresponds to reachable destinations. Interdo-
main routing violates this property because routing han-
dles (i.e., IP prefixes) lack failure atomicity. A routing
handle is failure-atomic if, from any given external lo-
cation, either all addresses within the routing handle are
reachable, or none are. A failure-atomic routing handle
allows route updates to accurately reflect the reachability
(or lack thereof) to destinations named by the handle.
To see the problem with IP prefixes, consider a cus-
tomer network with prefix 2.1.0.0/16 served by a provider
with a prefix 2.0.0.0/8.1 The provider will typically ad-
vertise only the aggregated /8 prefix rather than individu-
ally advertise the prefixes of each of its customers. When
the link to customer A fails, the provider often contin-
ues to advertise the whole /8 prefix rather than only ad-
vertise the prefixes currently available. As a result, other
ASes wrongly believe that addresses within 2.1.0.0/16 are
reachable via the advertised route when, in fact, they are
not. More generally, the consequence of such scalability-
driven aggregation is that routers today receive—and at-
tempt to use—invalid routes that don’t correspond to us-
able paths. Even if a customer network has a backup link
via another provider (a growing trend), the alternate path
may never be discovered or used by routers in the rest of
the Internet.
Previous work supports this point. For example, Feam-
ster et al. observe that, for a set of hosts around the world,
many end-to-end path failures (in most cases, over 70%)
are not reflected in BGP [8, Fig. 13]. The authors hypothe-
size that route aggregation is the cause for this poor corre-
spondence. Moreover, recent work has shown that IP pre-
fixes correlate poorly with geographic locality [10]; we
believe (but have not yet demonstrated) that locality is
highly correlated with failure, suggesting further that pre-
fixes are improper routing handles.
Secure Routing: There is no inherent relationship or
authoritative database linking an organization’s AS num-
ber to its allocated IP addresses. The simultaneous use of
two logically distinct and numerically unconnected ad-
dressing schemes causes the origin authentication prob-
lem, in which a rogue (or buggy) AS can “hijack” IP ad-
1In CIDR, provider-dependent addressing is critical for scalability.
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Figure 1: Forwarding behavior in AIP. Source S in ADS sends
a packet to receiver R in ADR. T is a transit router. The AIP
addresses in the packet are shown. The forwarding tables at the
border routers (BS , BR, T ) are also shown; the entry used for
forwarding is shown in bold.
dress space (i.e., advertise an IP prefix that it does not
own) and “blackhole” traffic. Its companion is the path
authentication problem: although each route contains in-
formation about the sequences of ASes traversed by the
announcement, the routing infrastructure does not guar-
antee either the accuracy of this information or its corre-
spondence to the AS sequence that traffic actually follows
en route to the destination.
Traffic engineering: Today, many networks intention-
ally advertise more-specific prefixes (deaggregation), ex-
ploiting longest prefix matching to control how traffic
reaches them. Yet, other ASes may aggregate sets of
smaller contiguous prefixes to reduce routing table size.
These conflicting operations often violate the originat-
ing network’s policies, reduce stub networks’ control over
traffic, and lead to unpredictable traffic flow. We posit that
interdomain traffic engineering is both complex and un-
predictable because the granularity of today’s routing han-
dles (i.e., IP prefixes) can be manipulated by entities not
originating them.
3 AIP: A Modest Proposal for the Future
The best of prophets of the future is the past.
—Lord Byron
In this section, we propose an alternative addressing struc-
ture, called atomic IP (AIP), which attempts to redress the
problems raised above. AIP’s design is guided by the fol-
lowing three principles:
1. Failure-atomic units: The administrator of a network
should be able to define that network as a failure-
atomic unit.
2. Immutable granularity of routing handles: If a route
corresponding to a failure-atomic unit originates
from a given organization, then no other organiza-
tion should be able to change the granularity of any
routing handle that includes that organization.
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3. Address-to-organization binding: Every interdomain
address should be bound to the organization that
owns the address.
In AIP, each failure-atomic network, called an atomic do-
main (AD), has a unique identifier (its AD number). In
practice, each AS would be divided into one or more ADs
(we address this issue later in this section). The interdo-
main address of each host has the form AD:LID, where
AD is the AD number of the host and LID is the local iden-
tifier (e.g., a local address) of the host within the AD. The
domain name system (DNS) would include an AIP-record
containing the AIP address(es) for a hostname.
The LID component of an AIP address uniquely iden-
tifies a host within an AD, but AIP does not mandate
or specify the LID’s form or structure. Each AD could
pick its own LID format based on its intradomain network
layer (e.g., IPv4, IPv6, an MPLS tag, a virtual LAN iden-
tifier, etc.), or even use a topology-independent end-point
identifier (as in HIP [19], UIP [9], or DOA [27]).
Interior and border routers in an AD maintain routing
information on a per-AD basis for destinations in other
ADs; i.e., an AIP routing table maps AD numbers to
“next hop” locations but does not maintain any informa-
tion about LIDs in other ADs. The border routers par-
ticipate in an interdomain routing protocol (e.g., BGP)
to exchange these mappings. As in the current Internet,
each router also participates in an interior routing proto-
col (e.g., OSPF) to maintain routing information to the
LIDs within the AD. Note that AIP does not specify or
mandate any particular choice of interdomain or internal
routing protocol.
As shown in Figure 1, a host sends a packet to some
destination by specifying the destination’s AD:LID. Un-
til the packet reaches the destination AD, each router for-
wards the packet based only on the AD. When the packet
reaches some border router in the destination AD, that
router forwards the packet to its destination based on the
packet’s LID.
The rest of this section discusses how AIP deals with
the issues of failure atomicity, routing security, and better
traffic control.
3.1 Failure Atomicity
To achieve failure-atomicity, each stub network in the cur-
rent Internet located in a single city, or point-of-presence
(PoP), would constitute a failure-atomic AD. Similarly,
for a medium- or large-sized AS, the set of addresses in a
single PoP would constitute an AD.
To estimate the number of ADs under this construction,
we worked with other researchers who have access to var-
ious data sets classifying prefixes according to origin AS
and geographic location; we found that the Internet has
between 80,000 and 100,000 distinct ADs [25]. Current
router hardware can easily support routing and forwarding
tables of this size. In fact, this size is smaller than the num-
ber of prefixes in today’s core border routers. The reason
for the smaller number is explained by a recent study [10],
which shows that each AS today announces many discon-
tiguous prefixes from the same location (because of im-
proper address space allocation). These prefixes cannot be
aggregated into one routing table entry even though all of
these prefixes “share fate” when any external link fails.
We need to distinguish between the routing handles
used in a route to name the destination and the objects
that are used merely for internal computations in the rout-
ing protocol (e.g., AS numbers in the AS path of BGP).
AIP uses AD numbers to name destinations. However, we
need to use names with a larger granularity than ADs to
describe the path in the route. To see why, if a transit AS
wanted to shift traffic between PoPs, the AD path of routes
through the affected PoPs would change, requiring a tran-
sit AS to propagate a new route. To alleviate this problem,
we propose the following optimization: transit networks
should have an AD number for the entire AS (called the
“AS-level” AD number), in addition to the failure-atomic
(“PoP-level”) AD number. When the AD is being used as
a transit network for an external destination, the AIP bor-
der router inserts the AS-level AD number in the AD path
of the route announcement, rather than the failure-atomic
AD number. In this way, the transit AS could shift traffic
between PoPs without introducing any new routing update
messages (presuming the rest of the AD path remained the
same). When an AD originates a route though, that AD’s
border router inserts the failure-atomic AD number in the
AD path of the BGP update so that ADs within the AS are
themselves failure-atomic.
3.2 Routing Security
In §2, we argued that BGP lacks mechanisms that pro-
vide origin authentication or path authentication. In this
section, we explain how AIP eliminates the former and
simplifies the latter.
Origin authentication (i.e., a secure mapping between
IP prefixes and ASes) is a hard problem today because no
authentic mapping exists between routing handles (pre-
fixes) and the entities announcing them (ASes). Maintain-
ing the integrity of this indirection requires a “routing reg-
istry” (a public database storing the AS owner of each pre-
fix). Unfortunately, keeping such a database accurate and
up-to-date has proven difficult [12]. S-BGP [16] suggests
that ASes obtain certificates from a trusted authority (e.g.,
an Internet Registry) proving ownership of the prefixes
they announce. These certificates must still be kept up-to-
date as ASes delegate address space to their customers,
which proves unwieldy. AIP eliminates the need for ori-
gin authentication by removing the indirection between
the names of routing handles and the entities announcing
them. The routing handle is the AD number and thus triv-
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ially identifies the entity that owns it.
Proposals like S-BGP [16] and SPV [14] solve the path
authentication problem by having each AS along the AS
path sign the AS path attribute of the BGP update and
append the signature to the update before sending the up-
date to other neighboring ASes. A router receiving a BGP
update then establishes the authenticity of the AS path
in the update by verifying the signatures of all ASes in
the AS path. This description is incomplete, however, be-
cause saying that routers can verify signatures implies that
routers somehow know the public keys of the ASes. Giv-
ing routers this knowledge today requires a public key in-
frastructure (PKI), i.e., a trusted third party issuing certifi-
cates of the form “AS X’s public key is K.” Establishing
such a PKI is burdensome.
AIP eliminates the need for a PKI because ADs can
be named by the public keys themselves (this mecha-
nism is inspired by other systems that use self-certifying
names [18, 19]). Naming ADs after public keys is not a
radical departure from the status quo: AS numbers, after
all, are already flat names and encode no semantics. Of
course, public keys are large, and putting several in a sin-
gle route advertisement might be impractical; accordingly,
we propose that AD numbers be hashes of public keys
rather than the public keys themselves. This optimization
mandates a bootstrapping mechanism for exchanging the
actual public keys. To this end, routers could simply ex-
change public keys in separate routing BGP messages, a
lookup service could be used to resolve the hash of an AD
to its public key as in Secure Origin BGP (soBGP) [28],
or the route announcements could periodically contain the
public keys.
Once ADs are named by hashes of public keys, path
authentication in AIP proceeds exactly as in (and provides
the same guarantees as) S-BGP: some router in ADi signs
the AD path [ADi+1 ADi . . . AD0]. A router receiving an
announcement with this AD path verifies every signature
in the route update before installing the route in its routing
table. Thus, each route advertisement must be signed once
by each AD along the AD path; a router that receives a
route must verify N −1 signatures, where N is the number
of labels on the AD path.
Critics have argued [14] that S-BGP’s cryptography
is prohibitive, but we disagree. First, route processors on
routers are becoming faster. For example, Cisco’s CRS-
1 route processor is 1.2GHz. Second, S-BGP could use
a more efficient cryptosystem such as ESIGN [21]. Mi-
crobenchmarks show that in the ESIGN cryptosystem, a
3 Ghz processor can perform sign and verify operations
on 2048-bit keys in 150 and 100 microseconds, respec-
tively [17, §7.2.2]. Assuming that a router may learn on
the order of 100,000 ADs, with two or three routes per
AD, each having an average path length of 4, a router
would be able to verify an entire routing table’s worth of
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Figure 2: Traffic control using delegation. Sender S resolves
the DNS name of traffic controlled host H to get its delegation
record ADU :ADH:LIDH. Traffic from S to H goes via ADU . The
AIP header field used for forwarding at each stage is in boldface.
signatures on the order of minutes; of course, peak load
would be substantially less. Third, public key operations
can easily be offloaded to a set of dedicated computers in
the AD.
One disadvantage to naming ADs with public keys is
that revoking a public key results in a change in the AD
number of the AD. As a result, either all of that AD’s route
advertisements must be withdrawn and re-advertised with
the hash of a new public key or additional BGP messages
that signal change in the AD number should be propa-
gated with BGP updates. Revocation also requires updat-
ing DNS entries for end hosts whose ADs change. But we
believe the benefits of eliminating a PKI (which would
have to handle revocation anyway) outweigh these prob-
lems with key revocation (which we assume will be a rare
event).
3.3 Traffic Control
By design, the AD number in a route update is flat and
cannot be manipulated. Hence the mechanisms used to
control inbound traffic in today’s Internet (e.g., announc-
ing more specific prefixes of a larger prefix) cannot be
used with AIP. In this section, we propose a mechanism
that allows organizations to control inbound traffic in AIP.
(Outbound traffic control follows today’s approach: set-
ting the import policy of routes at the border routers.)
Inbound traffic control allows a network with two or
more upstream providers to specify that it prefers one of
those upstreams to carry traffic destined to a particular
host (or set of hosts).2 For example, an organization with
two Web servers within the same AD and two upstream
providers might want traffic destined to those servers to
arrive via different upstream ADs.
AIP uses DNS to perform inbound traffic control at the
granularity of individual hosts (unlike BGP, which pro-
vides only prefix-level control). If ADH wants to control
inbound traffic to one of its hosts, H, it modifies H’s DNS
entry to be instead ADU:ADH :LIDH (rather than simply
ADH :LIDH); here, ADU is the upstream AD preferred by
2An “upstream” here refers to an AD that is willing to carry traffic
for a downstream AD, not necessarily an immediate upstream provider.
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ADH . Hosts wishing to send traffic to H then resolve H’s
DNS name, get back this delegation record, and insert it
into the destination address of the packet. This scheme
is inspired by the idea of “delegation” used in other sys-
tems [22, 27].
Figure 2 shows a slight modification to the forward-
ing scheme described in §3 required to enable delegation.
Routers forward packets based on the AD number at the
top of the stack. When the topmost AD is reached, the
border router pops off the topmost AD number from the
destination address stack. If the next address is the stack
is an LID, the router forwards the packet to a host within
the AD. Otherwise, it forwards the packet to the next AD
in the stack of destination address.
This approach of controlling traffic to a host works
when the DNS name of the host is looked up before ini-
tiating communication; but AIP must also let ADs con-
trol return traffic to their hosts when their hosts have ini-
tiated connections. To this end, a host initiating commu-
nication (a “client”) inserts its own delegation record into
the source address field of the first packet of the communi-
cation (e.g., a SYN packet in the case of TCP); clients can
get their delegation records from their ADs using DHCP
or by hard-coding. The client’s remote peer then places
this delegation record in the destination address of the
packet when replying to the client.
The delegation mechanism described above is suscep-
tible to a man-in-the-middle attack: an adversary could
place its own AD as the upstream AD in a spurious dele-
gation record of a packet, causing return traffic from the
server to go to the adversary instead of to the client. To de-
fend against this attack, an end-host acting on a delegation
record ADU :ADH :LIDH to send traffic to H must verify
that ADH requested the delegation. So ADH must sign the
delegation record ADU :ADH :LIDH with its private key;
hosts sending packets to H then verify this signature.
4 Related Work
You can observe a lot just by watching.
—Yogi Berra
Although AIP is the first proposal to suggest that ad-
dresses should satisfy failure atomicity, several other
projects have recognized the shortcomings of routing
on IP prefixes and proposed various alternatives. Both
HLP [23] and BGP policy atoms [26] propose changing
the granularity of routes. However, HLP’s goals are com-
plementary to AIP’s: HLP aims for more scalability, bet-
ter isolation, and faster convergence. Also, HLP’s routing
handles are AS numbers; in contrast, AIP proposes finer-
grained AD numbers. BGP policy atoms reduce routing
table state by grouping prefixes that are subject to the
same policy [26]. Unlike policy atoms, AIP explicitly
groups routing handles according to failure atomicity; one
can think of an AD as a “failure atom”.
Several other proposals suggest changes to Internet
addresses, though for different reasons from AIP.3 The
GSE (or “8+8”) [6, 20] proposal suggests that end-host
addresses contain lower bits that identify the host, and
upper bits that, in contrast to AIP’s AD number, reflect
topology. These proposals (and other measurement stud-
ies [3]) lament the current fragmentation of IP space. AIP
gets around this problem by eliminating aggregation alto-
gether, whereas GSE encourages provider-based aggrega-
tion by letting hosts—which are unaware of their top ad-
dress bits—renumber easily when they switch providers.
NIRA’s [29] addresses, like AIP’s, have interdomain and
intradomain pieces but are hierarchical. NIRA lets an end-
host select its transit networks; thus, end-hosts have mul-
tiple addresses, one for each path to the core. Nimrod [4]
focuses on scalability, TRIAD [13] on content-based rout-
ing and stitching together NATed realms; both projects
have comprehensive scope, whereas AIP inherits much of
the status quo (e.g., BGP, DNS).
AIP’s addresses support heterogeneity by allowing
each AD the freedom to use its own local addressing
scheme. Plutarch [7] also connects heterogeneous net-
works (called “contexts”) but eschews a global address-
ing scheme like AIP’s. AIP modifies addressing, while
Plutarch admits IPv4 as one of many “contexts”. UIP [9]
also connects networks of different types but does so with
a global identifier space overlaid on IP; UIP could run on
top of AIP instead of IP.
AIP’s addressing scheme relates to several existing
proposals to secure routing. In §3.2, we discussed how
self-certifying route handles enable path authentication
schemes such as S-BGP [16] and SPV [14] without requir-
ing a PKI. Listen and Whisper [24], like AIP, uses public
key cryptography yet avoids a PKI; its purpose is to detect
inconsistencies in AS paths, a function subsumed by the
path authentication AIP inherits from S-BGP.
AIP allows a network better control over how traf-
fic reaches its network. Akella et al. studied the bene-
fits of providing this control to the increasing number of
networks with multiple upstream networks [1] and have
also proposed a DNS-based system to provide these net-
works control over inbound traffic at the AS level [2]. AIP
shares the goals of this system and also uses DNS for fine-
grained inbound traffic control, but it also proposes direct
AD-level control of inbound traffic.
5 Summary
This is not the end. It is not even the beginning
of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the be-
ginning. —Winston Churchill
In this paper, we argued that IP prefixes are the wrong
granularity for Internet routes because they are not failure-
3See the NIRA [29] and BANANAS [15] papers for more compre-
hensive lists of routing architecture proposals.
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atomic, they have no correspondence to the identity of the
network that owns them, and they can be manipulated by
other networks in ways that make traffic engineering more
difficult. We proposed an alternative two-level addressing
scheme called atomic IP (AIP), where each failure-atomic
unit of the network is named by a flat address called an
atomic domain (AD). Routing on ADs allows the routing
protocol to accurately reflect reachability while still scal-
ing to a large number of end hosts. We argued that nam-
ing each AD by its public key can make it easier to secure
interdomain routing without requiring a public key infras-
tructure, by simplifying path authentication and eliminat-
ing the need for origin authentication altogether. We dis-
cussed how delegation can help an AD control inbound
traffic in a way that, unlike IP prefixes, cannot be manip-
ulated by remote networks.
But what about adoption? Many in the networking re-
search and operations community have recognized that
the current interdomain routing architecture is bursting at
the seams, and is ripe for change. A useful direction for
the community would be to take the mix of proposed di-
rections and ideas, and develop consensus on the best way
forward. We believe that failure-atomicity and better rout-
ing security are desirable, and hope that the simple ideas
proposed herein (which are a throwback to the past) can
inform the debate about the future of Internet routing.
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